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Fair Division under Asymmetric Information
Eric van Damme
CentER, Tilburg University
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Nctherlands
Abatract: This paper considers the situation in which a single indivisible object has to be
allocated to one peroon out of a group whoae membera all have equal righta to it. Different
peroona value the object di(ierently and each person only knows his own value exactly. The
question is who should get the object and by how much thia person should compensate the others
in order to guarantee a fair and efficient allocation. After having shown that several well-known
methods perform unsatisfactory, we derive an impoasibility Lheorem showing that some classical
fair division methods cannot be implemented when there is incomplete information. Finally, we
give examples of inechanisnu that do guarantee fair and ef6cient outcomes.
1 Introduction
The problem of how to divide an indivisible object among a group of persons who all have equal
rights to it arises, for example, in divorce settlements and in inheritance situations in which there
are equivalent heirs bul there is no will. In a business setting, the problem arises in the dissolv-
ing of joint venturw. In thia papert we will assume that side payments between the parties are
possible and we will try to answer the question oí who should get the object and by how much
each of the other players should be compensated in order to obtain (ex post) a fair and efficient
allocation. Efficiency implies that the object should be allocated to the person who values is most.
The fairness criterion we will employ is the one proposed in Foley (1967): It is required that the
final allocation be envy free, i.e. no player should envy another, each player should prefer what
he himself receivea above what any other player receivea.
There exists an extensive literature on the fair division problem~. In this literature various
concepts of fairness have been proposed and several fair division methods, such a, divide and
rMost of the material in thi~ paper is taken from the unpublished working papcr Van Damme (1985).
~For example Crawford (1977), Crawford and Neller (1979), Kuhn (1967), Luce and Raiffa (1957, Chepter 14),
Pasner and Schmeidler (1978), Samuelson (1980), Steinhaus (1948) and Varien (1974).
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choose, randorn allocation followed by bargaining, and auclioning the object followed by an equal
division of the revenuc, have been analyaed. In most of the literature, attention has been re-
stricted to the case o[ conrpleee information~. ''requently, however, it will be the case thal each
player, although he may know exactly how much he himsel( values the objecl, has only somewhal
vague (probabilistic) information about his opponents' values. This opens up the possibility for
strategic manipulation: A person might pretend that he values lhe object more ( or less) than he
actually does in order to obtain a more favorableoutcome. Our aim in this paper is to study the
consequences of such stratrgic behavior in fair division situalions. Specifically we will investigate
whether it is possible to obtain fair and efficient outcomes when players use their private informa-
tion strategically.
Itecently, considerable attention has bcen devoled to the study of bargaining under asymmetric
information'. In this context tbe consequences of strategic behavior have been thoroughly inves-
tigated, and it has been shown that strategic behavior may prevent an ex post efficient outcome
bcing rcached. Allhough the insights generated by the bargaining literature are highly relevanC
for thc problem at hand (indeed we will make extensive use o( them), there are at least two novel
aspccts in thc fair division problem. First o( all we will see thal division mclhods thal treat the
players asymmelrically aggravate the incenlive problems. Methods that preserve the symmelry o(
the players are superior, they yield higher payoffs. As a consequence it is not desirable to reduce
the division problem to a bargaining problem by first allocating the property rights. Secondly,
in the bargaining literature, attention has been restricted to the e(6ciency aspect, questions of
fairncss have not becn considered.
It should be noted that in the more abstracl (cooperative) papers on games wilh incomplete
information by }larsanyi and Selten (1972) and Myerson (1979, 1984) some o[ lhe axioms are
based on equity considerations. However, these papers make lhe fundamental assumption lhat all
tfrat matters are the expected utilities al the interim stage, i.e. at the point in time where each
l~laycr knows his own value bul dces not yet know those of his opponents. In conlrast, in the
prescnt study our interest is also in lhe point in time where all values have been revealed as we
want lo guarantee that ex posl lhere is no envy. Hence, the crucial parametera for our study are
~txceptions are Ciith (1986), Giith and Van Damme ( 1986) and Lyon ( 1988). In some older papers it is
merely pointed out lhet lhc propoaed melhods are vulnerable to slratesic manipuletion, there is no analyeia of its
conxquences. Dubine (1977) has shown that minmax strate6ies imply truthful revelation of values in the Steinhaus
procedure.
cSee F~ennan and Wilson (1990) for s recent eurvey.
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the actual, ex post, utilitiea.
The remainder o( the paper is organized as follows. After having introduced some basic concepts
in Section 2, we study, for the apecial case in which there are only two participants, some well-
known division methods in Section 3. It ia shown that methods that keep players in symmetric
poaitiona (euch as auctions) outperíorm aaymmetric division methods (such as divide and choose),
but ihat also suctiona may yield outcomea that are not envy free. In Section 4 we show that all ex
post efticient mechanisms are equivalent al the interim stage (i.e. they generate the same expected
utilitiea) and that random allocation is the worst possible mechanism. Section 5 shows that several
'classical' fair division methods cannot be implemented when there is incomplete information, and
Section 6 gives an example o[ a mechanism that always generates fair and e(ficient outcomes.
Section 7 investigates whether positive resulta can also be obtained if one requires that equilibria
be in dominant strategies and Section 8 offers a brief conclusion.
2 The Division Problem
We consider a situation in which a single indivisible object haa to be allocated to one person from
a group of n. All playera have equal righta to the object, side payments are possible, and each
player is riak neutral and hae a utility function that is additively separable in money and the
object. Hence, if player i'a value of the object is v; and if t; is the monetary transfer that this
player pays, then his utility is u; - v; - t; if he gets the object while his utility is u, --e, if
he dcesn't get it. Each player'a valuation is known privately, but it is common knovv-ledge that
all values sre drawns independently from a distribution F with support (1!,v(. We assume that
the density J is positive and continuous and without loss of generality we take y- 0 and v- 1.
Hence, each player indeed values the object. ~
The problem ia to determine which player should get the object and by how much he should
compensate his partners so as to guarantee that the fina) allocation is both fair and e(ficient.
A mechanism is a game form specifying the allocation rules. Formally, a mechanism is a tuple
p-C A, p, t ~, where
A- At x... x A„ with A, being the ( nonempty) set of pure strategies of player i, (?.1)
sHence, we follow the eeminal ides from Haroanyi (1987-8) to convert a eitustion with incomplete information
to one with a~ymmetrit information. The seaumplion of independence simplifiee lhe problem, we haven't analyxed
the taee where valuee are correlated.
i2a
p-(p~,...,p„) with p; : A-a [0, 1] and ~,p,(a) - 1(or all a E A. (p;(a) is the probability
that i reccives the object if a is chosen), and (2.2)
t-(t;~);~ with t;~ : A--~ R and ~~ t;r(a) - 0 for all i and all a E A. (t;~(a) is the monetary
transfer that j has to pay (to a mediator) in case a E A is chosen and the object is allocated
to i). (2.3)
Note that in (2.2) we require that the object be allocated under all circumstances and that in
(2.3) it is required that the players' books always balance. In Section 7 the latter constraint is
relaxed by allowing the mediator lo act as a clearing house whose books have to balance only on
average rather than [or each value combination.
Given the mechanism u , a(pure) strategy for player i is a map o; :[0, 1) y A;, and a strategy
combination o is an n-tuple of strategies, one [or each player. We now introduce some additional
notation. For a value vector v we write vk for the highest value and v' for the second highest
value. We write a-( a-;,a;), v-(v-;,v;), o- (o-;,o;) and a`a; -(a-;,a;). Furthermore,
o(v) -(o~(v~),...,o„(v„)) and dF(v) - dF(v~)...dF(v~). Player i's expected transfer when a is
chosen is denoted by [;(a)
ti(a) - ~Pk(a)tk;(a)
k
If player i's opponents play according to o while player i himself chooses action a;, then his
expected transíer is
T,"(a;) - ~ t,(o(v)`a;) dF(v)
while the probability that he receives the object is
P`Ía;) - f P~(o(v)`a;) dF(v) (2.1i)
In this case, if players i's value is u;, then his expected utility is
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U;(a;; v;) - v;P,'(a~) - Ta(a;) (2.7)
The strategy combination o is a(Bayesian Nash) equitiórium of the mechanism N if for all i and
all v;
o;(v;) E argmax U'(a;;v;) (2.8)
A mechanism is said Lo be a direct mechanism i[ A; -[0,1~ for all i, i.e. players are asked to report
theit values. A direct mechanism is said to be incentive compatible i[ truthtelling (i.e. Q,(v,) - v;)
is an equilibrium. Note that if o is an equilibrium of the mechanism p, then the direct mechanism
~ determined by p;(v) - p;(o(v)) and t;~(v) - t;~(o(v)) is incentive compatible and leads to the
same allocation. Hence, the restriction to incentive compatible direct mechanisms is without loss
of generality. (This is the so-called revelation principle, see e.g. Myerson (1979).) For an incentive
compatible direct mechanism N, we simplify notation by writing P;(v;),T;(v;) and U;(v;) instead
of P,"(v;),T,"(v;) and Us(v;; v;), resp. where á denotea the strategy of truthtelling (á;(v;) - v; for
all i).
We conclude this section by epecifying three additional conditions that we want mechanisms to
satisfy. The requirements will be formulated only for direct mechanisms. An indirect mec}ianism
p is said to satisfy the requirements if it has an equilibrium o which is such that the direct
mechanism jr - p o o satisfies them. First o[ all, since ex ante the players are in symmetrical
positions we want the mechanism to be aymmetric, i.e. the mechanism should be anonymous:
The probability that a player gets the object should only depend on theweclor of values and not
on the player's name, and similarly for the transfera. In particular, symmetry implics that the
functions P;,T; and U; do not depend on the player index i, hence, from now on, we will drop this
index. Secondly, we want the allocation to be ex post efficient, i.e. the object should end up with
a player who values it most, hence
if p,(v) ~ 0, then v; - vA (2.9)
A mechanism is et post e,~cient if it satisfies (2.9) for all v. Finally, we want all players to be
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satisfied with the final allocation, i.e. the final allocation should be envy jree (Foley (1967)): Ex
post each pla}'er should (weakly) prefer what he himself receives above what is allocated to some
other player. This requirement implies that any two players that do not receive the objecL get lhe
same monctary transfer
t,~(v) - t,r(u) - -t„(v)~(n - 1) (or all i, j,l with j,l ~
It also irnplies that if player i gets the object, he prefers to makc the transfcr, i.e.
v, - t„(v) ~ 1„(v)~(n - 1) for all i, v with p,(v) ~ 0,
and that each player j not getting the object indeed prefers not to get it
t„(v)~(n - 1) ~ v~ - t„(v) for all j~ i, if p,(v) ~ 0.
Hence, we see that ex post efi'iciency is a necessary condition (or ex post fairness. The final
allocation is envy free if and only if the object is allocated efficienUy and the winner pays each
partner Lhe same amount r(v) with
v'~n G r(v) G v~~n (2.10)
where v~ (resp. v') denotes the highest (resp. second highest) value. A mechanism lhat generates
an envy free allocation for each possible value vector, will be called an ez posl jair mechanism.
The rernainder of the paper is devoted to the question of whether such mechanisms exist and what
thcir properties are.
3 Examples of Mechanisms
In tlris section several division methods that have been proposed in the literature will be illus-
lraled. Attention will be confined to lhe case in which there are only two participants and in
which F is the uniform distríbulion on ~0, I~.
A first procedure is random allocation: each player receives the object with probability 1~2
and lhere are no side payments. Clearly, lhis mechanism is very inefficient, in fact, the results of
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the next section imply that thia mechanism yields the lowest expected utility for each player, no
matter what hie value might be. One method for improving the performance of this mechanism
readily auggeats itself, viz. let the tandom allocation be followed by bargaining between the
partners. Since s player cannot be forced to Lrade i[ he doesn't want to, each player can only
gain by engaging in the bargsining and, therefore, the expected payo(fs will be higher. The final
allocation ( and, hence, the expected payofis) will depend on how the rules for the bargaining game
are epecified. For example, euppose that the rulea are that simultaneously the buyer and the seller
aubmit bids and that the object is transferred, tor a price equal to the average o[ the bids, if and
only íf the buyer's bid exceeds that of the seller. Chatterjce and Samuelson (1982) have shown
thst this game has an equilibrium" given by
o,(v,) - 2~3 v. - F 1~9 oe(v~) - 2~3 vy f 1~12, (3.1)
hence, in the range where trade is possible, the seller overstates his value while the buyer under-
statea his, and this has the consequence that the outcome is not always ex post ef6cient. Straight-
forward computations show that the strategies from (3.1) yield the expected utility function U
given by
1~4 v? f 1~8 v; f 9~64 if v; C 1~4
U(v;) - 1~2 v? ~ 10~64 if 1~4 C v; C 3~4
1~2 v? t 3~8 v; t 1~64 if v; 1 3~4
(3.2)
The reader might think that by using a different bargaining procedure, the performance of this
type of inechanism can be improved. However, it follows from the results of Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite (1983) that, no matler what the rules are, there will always be combinations of values
for which the object ends up with the person who values it leasl. Random allocatíon followed by
bargaining performs badly because players are treated asymmetrically: Once the initial property
rights have been assigned, the partnero have conflicting interests. In order to get a betler price, the
seller pretends that the object is worth more to him than it actually is while the buyer understates
his value; strategic behavior which implies that the players may fail to strike an efi'icient bargain.
These incentives for stralegic manipulation can be reduced by forcing the players to announce
their bids before the object is allocated; if a player docsn't know whether he will be the buyer or
eThere exiet other equiliDria aa well.
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the sellcr, then his bid will be closer to the actual value.' Formally, one may proceed as follows.
The players are asked to simultaneously submit bids 6t and 6z, and then the object is randomíy
allocated. If the random move assigns the object to player i, then player i may retain the object
if b; ~ 6„ otherwise he sells it to player j for the price p - (b; f b~)~2. Because of risk neutrality,
this mechanism is equivalent to the auction mechanism in which lhe players bid and lhe object
is allocated lo the highest bidder who pays his partner a compensation of p-(bt f 6z)~4. This
auction mechanism will be analyzed at lhe end of this section (it corresponds to the auction with
a- 1~2) and we will see that the expected utililies generated by this mechanisrn dominate those
given by (3.2).
Another mechanism that may be used is the divide and choose melhod, specifically the variant
of this method that has been proposed in Luce and R,aiffa ( 1957). Each person adds 1(per[ectly
divisible) ~noney unit to the pot, then a random move delermines wlto will be the divider, this
divider transfers a certain amount r[rom the pol to the object and his partner has lhe choice
between the object plus z or the remainder, 2- x, of the money. If player d is the divider and 6e
lransfers s E(1~2, 1~, then player e chooses the object i( v~ ~ 2- 2x, so that player d's expected
payoíÏ is
(2 - I)(22 - í) f(vd f 2)(2 - 22).
ííence, player d's optimal choice is
Id - 7~8 - ve~4
and the divider's equilibrium payofís are
Ue(va) - (vdl2 f 1~4)~
while those o( the chooser are given by
1~4 i( v~ C 1~4
U~(v~) - í~4 f(v~ - 1~4)' if 1~4 C v~ C 3~4 (3.4)
vr - 1~4 if vr ~ 3~4
'This srgument haa alao been made in Samueleon (19g5). Thet paper also discusaed the a-suction mecbanum
with a - 1~2.
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It is interesting to note ehat U~(v;) ~ Ue(v;) for all v;, hence, the method favors the chooser.
This is in sharp contrast to the case in which the values are perfectly known. In the latter case,
the method favoro the divider, he can extract all the surplus. Also note that, under incomplete
iníormation, the object ends up with the chooser if and only if v~ ~ 1~4 f va~2, hence, also this
method may lead to an inefficienl allocation. Again the reason is strategic manipulation: If ud is
amall (reap. lsrge), then the divider is tempted to transfer relatively little (resp. relatively much)
to the object, and i[ the chooser's value ia below ( resp. above) average, then the chooser takes the
alternative that the divider doesn't "expect" and an inefficient outcome results.
The cause oÍ the inefficiency associated with the divide and choose method is again the fact
that players are in asymmetric roles. It is better not to introduce roles and keep Lhe symmetry.
There are various possibilities for modifying the method in this way. We now discuss two of
these, both based on ideas of Banach and Knaater as reported in Steinhaus (1948). The essential
idea is to let the division be performed by a mediator. For example, the mediator continuously
transfers money írom the pot to the object until one o( the players shouts `stop'. This player
then receivea the object plus the money that has been transferred, his partner receives the re-
mainder of the money. It is clear that this mechanism is actually an auction mechanism. If we
writt a; - 1 f b;~2 for the value of the pot at which player i ehouts `stop', and interpret b; as
player i'a bid, then the highest bidder geta the object and he pays his partner a price equal to half
of his bid. (Hence, this is the special case of the auction mechanism introduced below with a- 1.)
Alternatively, the mediator may first add all money to the object and then continuously transfer
money from the object to the pot. In this case the person who first shouts `stop' receives the pot,
his partner receivp the object plus the remainder of the money. Again this mechanism is actually
an auction mechanism. If player i ahouta `stop' when the amount that has been transferred to
the pot is ~; and we write e; - 1-~ 6,~2 then (with b, being the bid o( player i) the highest bidder
gets the object and he pays this partner a price equal to hal[ of ehe bid ehat ehe partner made.
(Hence, this is the special case of the auction mechanism introduced next with a- 0.)
Generally, an auction mechanism may be described as follows. Simultancously the players bid
and the object is allocated to the highest bidder for a price of a times the highest bid, 6~, plus 1- a
times the second highest bid, 6,. The revenue~ of the auction are shared equally by the partners so
that, effectively, the winner pays his partner a compensation equal to (ab~ t(1 - a)b,)~`'. Above
weencountered ehe Dutch auction (a - 1), the Vickrey auction (a - 0) and the case witli a- 1~2
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as special cases. It is straight(orward to verify that the strategy combination o given by
o,(v,) - 2~3v, t 1~3(1 - ~) (3.5)
is a symmetric equilibrium of the auction mechanism. In Van Damme (1984) it was shown that
lhis strategy pair is actually the unique symmetric equilibrium. Note that the equilibrium strategy
is monotonic, hence, the person wilh the highest value bids highest so that the object always ends
up wilh the person who values it most. Fíence, any auction mechanism is ex post efficienta. The
reader can easily veri(y that the expected payoffs associated with the auction mechanism are given
by
U(v,) - v,'~2 t 1~6. (3.6)
Hence, the expected payoffs are independent of a, a fact that is explained by the results of Sect. 4.
The reader also notes that in terms of expected utilities the auction mechanisms indeed dominate
random allocation (ollowed by bargaining ( the RHS from ( 3.6) is always strictly larger than that of
(3.2)) as well as the divide and choose method ( if U is as in ( 3.6), then U(v;) ~ UQ(v;)~2-} U~(v;)~2
with equality only for v; E{1~6,5~6}). Although the different auction methods are equivalent
at the interim stage ( i.e. when a player only knows his own value), they are not equivalent ex
post: the transfer payments depend on a. If vt ~ vz, then player 1 pays player 2 the amount
avt~3 t(1 - a)(v~~3 f 1~2). One notes that this transfer cannot always lie between v~~2 and vt~2
so that no auction mechanism is ex post fair.
The fol)owing two conclusions emerge trom these examples. Mechanisms that have players play
different roles typically lead to inefficient outcomes. Symmetric mechanisms have better ef~iciency
properties, but also these mechanisms may yield outcomes that are not ex post (air. ln the Sections
6 and 7 we will describe mechanisms that are ex poat fair. In Sect. 4 we explain why all auction
mechanisms are equívalent at the interim stage.




In this section we derive s`revenue equivalence theorem' that explains why all auction mechanisms
are equivalent st the interim stage. From now on attention will be restricted to direct mechanisms.
By the revelation principle, this is without loss of genetality.
We start by giving a characterization of incentive compatibility. Recall that a direct mechanism
ia aaid to be incentive compatible if truthtelling is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. i( for all i and all
v;, w; E [0,1]
v;P(v;) - T(v;) ? v;P(w;) - T(w;) (4.1)
where P and T are defined by (2.5) and (2.6) and by the remarks concerning notation that were
made after (2.8). The proof of Lemma 1 is standard and follows ideas outlined in Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983). (See also Cramton et sl. (1987).) To make the paper self-contained, how-
ever, the proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 1. A direct mechanism p is incentive compatióle if and only if P is nondecreasing and
T is refated to P nccording to
T(v;) - T(0) f f ~ xdP(x)
0
(v; E [0,1])
Since transfers sum to zero for each realized vector o( values (Eq. (2.3)) and since players are
treated symmetrically, we have that ~
f T(v;)dF(v;) - 0. (4 3)
Together with (4.2) lhis boundary condition implies that, for incentive compatible mechanisms,
T and therefore U is completely determined by P. In particular it follows that all ex post efPicient
mechanisms are equivalent at the interim stage. (All such mechanisms have P(v,) - f'(v,)"-'.)
Straighlforward calculations show that




U(v,) - I~(F(z) t zj(x) - 1)P(x)dx t I~~ P(z)dz (4.4)
0 0
For ex post efÏicient mechanisms, thís expression can be rewrilten as
U(v,) - n t n n 1 J ~ F"(x)dz -~~ F"-'(x)dx t I~ F""~(x)dx (4.5)
Let us remark lhat the constant term U(0) in Eq. (4.5) is equal to (l~n)th of the expected revenue
generated when the object is auclioned, say by the Vickrey procedure (or indeed by any auction
procedure lhat always allocates the object to the person who values it most). We return to this
property in Section 7. The following proposition summarizes lhe results obtained lhus [ar
Proposition 1. The expected utility junction U associated with an incentive compatible mech-
anism depends only on the probability function P and is given 6y ({.~J. For ez post e,~cient
mechanisms, P(x) - F(x)"-~ and then lhe ezpected utility junction is given by (~.SJ.
Nole that Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 imply that the expected utility function U is nonde-
creasing and convex. Another interesting property is that U(v;) 1 v;~n for each mechanism and
each value v;, hence, each mechanism yields at least as much ulility as random allocalion does.
Note lhat Proposition 2 implies that the individual rationality constraints are not binding, each
player is, no matter what his value might be, willing to parlicipate in any mechanism.
Proposition 2 . Every mechnnism is (weaklyJ prejerned to rnndom allocation, i.e. U(v;) ~ v;~rr
jor any incenliue compntióle mechnnism.
ProoL Sce lhe appendix.
From now on allention will be restricted to ex post efficient mechanisms. The following Propo-
sition, which states that ex ante efficiency is equivalent to ex post efficiency, provides an additional
justificalion for this restriclion. Namely the proposilion implies that there does not exist a mech-
anism that is uniformly pre(erred above an ex post efficient mechanism. A mechanism is said
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to be ex ante efficient if it maximizes the ex ante expected payoRs over lhe sel of all incentive
compatibk mechaniams, i.e. iI M is the set of all incentive compalible mechanisms satisfying (2.1)
-(2.3), then v E M ia es ante efficient if
f U„(v;)dF(v;) C I U„(v;)dF(v;)
for all p E M, where U„(v;) ia player i's expected payoff aasociated with N if his value is v;.
Propoaition 3. The mecAaniam p ia ez ante efficient ij and only iJ it yields an ez posl efficient
outcome for almoat aIl vnlue comóinationa, i.e. ij (2.9J ia aatiafied jor almost all v.
Proof. Let v be any ex post efficient mechanismo. Then for any mechanism p we have in view of
(4.3)
I U„(v;)dF(v;) - I v;P(v;)dF(v;)
Furthermore, with v" being the highest component of v, we have
n i v;P(v;)dF(v;) - n f v;p;(v)dF(v)
- f~ v;p;(v)dF(v) c f v" ~ p;(v)dF(v)
~ ~
- J v"dF(v) - n I U~(v;)dF(v;)
Since the inequality in the above chain is strict unless ( 2.9) is satisfied (or almost all v, the proof
ia complete. o
5 An Impossibility Theorem
In this section we turn to some resolutions o( the fair division problem that have becn proposcd in
the literature for the case in which the value vector is commonly known, and we will show that the
~Such a mechaniem indeed exiete: In Van Dsmme ( 1984) it wee shown that the a-auction methode dl5cus5ed in
Section 3 have this property. Crnmton el al. (1987) heve ahown thet, more aenerAlly, ex post e(licient mechanisms
exiat if and only it the initial dietribution of oMnerohip eharee is not "too aeymmetric".
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allocations corresponding to these procedures cannot be implemented when there is incomplete
information about the players' values.
A fair division method is a mapping m that assigns to each value vector v a utility u;"(v) for
each player i. For an incentive compatible direct mechanism N let us write u;'(v) for the utility
that player i gets from {r when the value vector is v(assuming, o( course, that the truthtelling
equilibrium is played in N). Fíence u;'(v) - v,p;(v) - t;(v). We say lhat the fair division method
m can be impfemented if there exists an incentive compatible mechanism p with u; (v) - u; (v)
(or all i and v. We will skiow that neither the Sleinhaua division method (Steinhaus (1998)), nor
the egalitarian division can be implemented in case there is incomplete in(ormation. Since both
methods can be obtained by applying the Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950)) resulting fro~n
an appropriately chosen threat point, we turn to the Nash bargaining solution first.
Assume that the vector o( values v is common knowledge. Since side payments are possible,
the Pareto efficient frontier in utility space is given by
{uER"; ~u;-v~}
I( d is the utility vector in case of disagreement and ~; d; G va, then the Nash bargaining solution
of the problem is the utility vector u' determined by
~ u; - v~ and u; - d; - u~ - d~ all i
hence
u; - d; ~ (v" - ~d;)~n (5.1)
Two choicea of d appear natural. If in case o[ conflict the object is destroyed then d; - 0 for all
i and u; - vh~n. Tliis allocation corresponds to the egalitarian solution, the side payments are
arranged in such a way that all players have equal payofis. A second possibility ia to resort to
random allocation in case of conflict. Then d; - v;~n for all i and the resulting allocation is the
one proposed in Steinhaus (1948). Steinhaus calls v,~n the `fair share' of player i and he proposes
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to divide equally the surplus that remains after each player has received his fair share. Note that
the Steinhaus sllocation ia not envy free.
The main result of this section is
Proposition ~. Neither lAe egatilarian altocation nor lhe Steinhaue allocation can 6e implt-
mented when tAtre u asymmetric inJormation aóout the va(ue veetor v.
Proof. For a E(0,1) write
u~ (v) - av;~n f ~va - a~ v~~n~ ~n (5-2)
Then ~- 0 corresponds to the egalitarian solution while a- 1 yields the Steinhaus allocation.
We have to show that there does not exisl an incentive compatible mechanism p with u; (v) -
v;p;(v)- t;(v) - u; (v) for all v. Assume such a mechanism p does exist. Then {~ is ex post e(ficient
~o that, from Proposition I, we get U'(v;) - P(v;) - F(v;)"'~. On the other hand, Eq. (5.2)
yields
nU(v;) - n J u; ( v-;, v;)dF ;(v-;)
so that
~
n n 1 av; - 1- v,F(v~)"-~ ~- ~, zdF(x)"-~ -(n - 1)a ~ zdF(z)~n
n-1
nU'(v;) - a -} F(v,)"-~
n
Combining this expression with U'(v,) - F(u,)"-~ yields
F"~'(v;) - a~n,
hence, F is constant. But this contradicts the assumption that we have a siluation with incom.
plete information. ~
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It is interesting to investigate which consequences strategic behavior has on the final outcome
i( the Steinhaus procedure or the egalitarian procedure is used to deterrnine the allocation. Iden-
ti(ying a stated value wilh a bid, we see that the rules of the latter procedure correspond to those
of an auction in which the object is allocated to the highest bidder who pays each o[ his partners
l~nth of his bid. In general this method yields an ex post efHcient outcome, but as we know
from Section 3 the outcome need not be ex post tair. ( The egalitarian method corresponds to
the a-auction from Sectioo 3 with a- 1.) The Steinhaus procedure corresponds lo an auction
in wlrich the highest bidder ( say this is player i) receives the object and in which this person
pays each player j an amount equal to b~~n t(b; -~~ 6~~n)~n. Lyon ( 1986) has shown that this
auction mechanism has a symmetric, inereasing equilibrium. Hence, this mechanism is also ex
post efficient and the interim expected payofi-s are given by ( 4.5). In the case of 2 players these
rules correspond to those of the auction mechanism (rom Section 3 with a- 1~2, hence, the final
uutcome ncrd not be fair.
6 A Possibility Theorem
In this seclion we show that it is possible to ensure that the final allocation will be envy free by
giving an example of a mechanism leading to fair allocations.
Proposition 5. There ezisls an incentive compatibfe, ez post fair rnechanism.
Proof: For a value vector v E It„ let vti be the highest component of v and Iet v' be the second
highest component of v. Consider the following direct mechanism: The object is allocated to the
person with the highest value, he pays the amount
t(vs,v~) - n`vs - l A FÍz)dz 1 (6.1)
to each o( his partners. lu case lhere are multiple, say k, players with the highest value Lheu each
uf them receives the object with probability l~k and the person getting the ubject pays each of
his partners vti~n.
Clcarly, this n~cchanism lrcats the players symtnetricalfy. Furthenuorr, thc amouut that the
wiuner pays to each of his partners lies inbetween v'~n and v~~n so lhat the mechanisin is ex post
fair. !t remains to verify that thr mechanism is incentive compatible, i.e. that lruthtelling is a
tiash eyuilibriun~. Siuce the mechanism is ex post efficient, it suffices, by Leunna l, to show that
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theexpected transfer payments satis[y T'(v;) - v;P'(v;) -(n- 1)v; j(v,)F(v,)"-7. The verification
o( this identity involves straightforward calculations which are carricd out in the appendix. O
Note that, aince the mechanism from Proposition 3 is a direct mechanism, it is context de-
pendent, i.e. the rules of the mechanism directly depend on lhe characteristics ot the underlying
nncertainty, i.e. the mechanism depends on the distribution function F. The author has not
tucceeded in finding a context independent mechanism of which the equilibrium gives rise to the
direct mechaniem from Proposition 3. It should also be noted lhat the mechanism described in
(6.1) is probably not the unique ex post fair mechanism, however, in a certain scnsc it is the
rimplest one possible. Namely, it is the unique ex post fair mcchanism for which the transfers
depend only on v~ and v' and for which
8t(v~,v')
is independent of v', and
av~
8t(va, v')
is independent of vti.
av'
7 Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
Up to now we have focused on Bayeyian Nash equilibria of inechanisrru. It is easily seen thal,
without relaxing some of our requirements, no positive results can be obtained for the stronger
notion of dominant strategy equilibria. Truthtelling is a dominant strategy (or each player in the
direct mechanism N if
v;p;(v) - t;(v) ~ v;p,(v`w;) - t;(v`w;) for all i, v, w, (7.1)
with the inequality being strict for at least one value vector v. For ex post efiicient mechanisms,
eondition (7.1) implies that the winner's transfer payment should be independent of his value,
and that also each looser's transfer must be independent of this player's value. In ex post fair
mechanisma all loosera receive the same payoff, which by (7.1) can, therefore, only depend on the
winner's value. Hence, if the transfers have to balance for each combination of values (condition
(2.3)), then the transfers must be constant, but surely a mechanism in which the eransfers do not
depend on the value vector cannot be ex post [air. llence,
proposition 8. There dots nol ezisf an ez post fair mechanism jor v;hich truthftlling is an
tqniliórium in dominant strategies.
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If one insists on equilibria in dominant strategies, then positive results can be obtained by
relaxing condition (2.3): One may be satisfied if the transfers balance on average, i.e. if condition
(4.3) is satisfied instead o[ condition (2.3). Condition (4.3) may be established by allowina the
ntediator to act as a clearing house who balances the payments. (If inediators are risk neutral and
if the market for mediators is competitive, the players will indecd be able to find a mediator who
is willing to play this role.) I3y reviewing the proo[ o( Proposition 1, one sees that condilion (2.3)
is not essential (or this result to hold, the proof just uses (4.3). Hence, i( the mediator has zero
expecled profits, then (in an incentive compatible mechanism) Lhe player's expected utilities are
still given by (4.4). To have an ex post fair mechanism with an eyuilibrium in dominant strategies,
the winner should pay an amount w(v) that does not depend on his own value, while each looser
should get an amount I(v) that only depends on the winner's value. Furthermore, it should be
the case that vh - w(v) )!(v) 1 v' - w(v). One possibility immediately suggesls itself: The
mediator first buys the object Sor a price B of which each player receives B~n; after the mediator
has acyuired it, he sells is again to one of the partners by using lhe Vickrey (1962) procedure,
i.e. the object is allocated to the highest bidder who pays the second highest bid. llence, using
the above notation, w(u) - -B~n t v' and f(v) - B~n. Clearly, truthtelling is a dotninanL strat-
egy and the resulting allocaeion is always [air. Furthermore, in light of the remarks made abovc,
lhe mediator's expected payo(fs are zero if his bid B is equal to nU(0) where U(0) is given by (4.5).
An alternative possibility is that the mediator uses the inlorrnation revealed by the auction
tu detertnine the compensation of the loosers rather than to determine the price that the winner
should pay. Specifically, the mediator may use the (ullowing procedure. First he asks each player
tu coutribule an amuunl C eyual to (n - 1)~n times the expectation of lhe highest value (i.e.
C-(n - 1) J u"dF(u)~n). After these conlributions have been made he auctions the object. This
tinre, however, the winner does not have lo pay anything, rather it is the case that each looser
n~cci.cs an amount cyual to the winner's value. Hence, in terms of the above notation, w(u) - C
:urd 1( r~) - u" - C. Again truthtclling is a dominant strategy and, no maUcr what the values are,
all playcrs have the sarne uet payo(fs. Hence we have shown
Yroposition 7. IVilh an acliue rnedialor, who is used !o balance !he budgels uu uueruye, lhere
ensls an ei post farr rnechunism Jor which lrulhlelling is an egurfibriurn in dominanl slralegies.
In Jnr! drere erist; such a rnrchanism lhal leads !o Ihe eyalilariun oulcurne, i.e. ufl players huve
drr ,~rrnr nr! puyo~.
139
Clearly, Lhe mechanisms discussed in this section are viable only iC the mediator is able to
make an accurate assessment o( the value of the object, i.e. if he knows the distribulion F. It ~~~ill
also be clear that even if he knows F, he will be reluctant to use the second procedure discussed
above. Namely, although truthtelling is a dominant strategy in the game, thc mcdialor shoul~i fcar
that the agents will try to increa.ge their payotïs by more sophisticated ways of manipulating tLc
outcome. For example, the players could make a secret contract that each player will bid his valuc
plus an amount r and that each looser will pay the winner r~n. With this contract in place it is a
dominant strategy for each player i to bid v; f z in the medialor's auction game. Compared with
the original situation in which there is no contract each player increases his payoff by (rt - 1)r~,r,
at theexpense oithe mediator who makes an expected loss of (n- 1)r. Ilence, it is very unlikely
that we will observe such a mechanism in practice.
8 Conclusion
ln this paper we have investigated a simple fair division situation with incomplele information.
The analysis was simplified by the assumptions of symmetry (all values are drawn from lhc sainc
distribution) and independence (all values are drawn independently). Further research shoulcl be
devoted to relaxing these assumption. The assumption o( independence seems especially inappro-
priate in the case of the dissolving of joint ventures, one of the examples that was mentioned in
the Introduction. In that case the value of each partner depends on the future prospects for the
business about which the partners may have different information.
The paper was molivated by the idea that it is desirable to guarantee an ex post fair outcome.
It may be questioned whether ex post fairnesa is indeed desirable, especially since some types of
a player may, at the interim stage, prefer non-fair mechanisms above fair ónes'o. In Van Darnme
(1985) it was shown that, for the example discussed in Section 3, the expected utility for a player
with value 1~2 is maximized by a mechanism that assigns the object to the person with the highest
value when this value is not in the interval [1~4,3~4~ and that allocates the object randomly if
the highest value is in this interval. ln that paper it was also shown that only a type with value
v; - 0 or v; - I prefers an ex post fair mechanism above any other mechanism. 1f one does
taWhy thie is eo tnn eaaily be eeen in an asymmelric example. Suppose lhal player 1 values the object at v~ - 0
and lhal player 2 vnlues lhe objecl eilher at v~ - 0(with probnbility p) or at v~ -]00 (with probability 1- p).
In an ex poet fair incentive compatible mechaniem, player 4 always óeta the object and he pays at most S for it. If
p ie sufRciently emall player I clearly prefera a methnnism in which the object ia allocated only to player T if this
player ia willin6 lo pay n eulficiently hiRh price for it.
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not insist on ex post efiiciency, theu the allocation mechanism should reflect a fair comprornise
betwexn the alternative types o( a playerrt aud lhe solutions of Efarsanyi and Sellen (1972) and
hlyerson (1984) specify axioms for determining such [air compromises. I[, however, one insists on
ex post e(Ciciency, then Proposition 1 shows that the interim ulilities are completely determined
so that according to Harsanyi~Selten and Myerson all mechanisms are equivalent. At the ex post
stage, however, such mechanisms are not necessarily equivalent: some o( these guarantee ex post
(air mechanisrns while others do not.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If N is incentive compatible, then (4.1) holds aud by rearranging and
interchanging the roles of v, and w; we obtain
w,(P(v;) - P(w,)) L T(v;) - T(wt) C v;(P(v;) - P(w,)),
so that P must be nondecreasing. Furthermore, T is differentiable wheuever P is, and at such
points oi difïerentiability T'(v,) - v,P'(v;). At othet points, a jump in v;P(v;) is matched by
a jump in T(v,) and such discontinuities are accounted for by in the integral in (4.2), which is
understood to be a Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral. Hence, (4.2) is indeed corcect.
Conversely, if (9.2) holds, then for any v;, w; E[0, 1]
T(v,) - T(w,) - ~~. rdP(r) G~y~ v,dP(x) - v,(P(v,) - P(w;)),
which, after rearranging, yields lhe incentive compatibiGty condition (4.1). O
Proof of Proposition 2. Because of symmetry, ttre ex ante probability that a player receives
the object is l~n, hence f P(r)dF(r) - l~n. In view of (4.4) we therefore have to show that
v, ~~ f(z)P(r)dr C I~(F(r) t rf(r) - 1)P(r)dr -} ~~~ P(z)dr,
or, cyuivalently
f~,
v,j(r)P(r)dr tI (v,f(r) ~ 1)P(r)dx G~~(F(z)-} rf(r))P(r)dr
~uw by using partial integration it is easíly seen that
IV~Iu, - r)I(r)P(r)dr G ~~. F(r)P(r)dr
so lhat it sufGces to show that
I~(u,f(z) t 1)P(r)dz C I' (h~(r) -~ rf(r))P(r)dr,
ur cyuivalrutly
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I. (1 - F(z))P(x)dz C I~(z - v,)J(r)P(r)dr.
lntegrating the integral of the R((S by parts we see that wc have to show that
I ~(1 - F(z))P(z)ds C(1 - v;)P(1) - J t F(x)P(z)dx -~~(z - i~,)F(r)dP(z)V V
which is equivalent to
1 , P(z)dx c(1 - v~)P(1) - I , (x - v;)F(i)dP(r)
By integrating the integral of the LHS by parts it is seen that this inequality is equivalcnt to
v;(P(1) - P(v;)) - f , zdP(z) C- 1 (z - v;)F(r)dP(r).
which in turn is equivalent to
I~(x - v;)(1 - F(z))dP(x) ~ 0,
an inequality which is clearly satisfied. ~
Proof of Proposition 5: It temains to be shown that the mechanism determined by (6.l)
is incentive compatible, i.e. that T'(v;) - v;P'(v;) -(n - 1)v; j(v;)F(v;)"-~. Write z- v~; (resp.
y- v!;) for the highest ( resp. aecond highest) component of v-;. Then the joint distribution C~
of x and y is given by ,
F"-'(x) f (n - 1)F"-~(y)(F(x) - F(y)) if x 1 y
~(2,y) -
F"-'(y) if x C y,
and the associated joint density is equal to
rG(z~y) - S (n
- 1)(n - 2)i(x)I(y)F(y)"-3 if x~ y
I 0 if rCy
With t given by (5.1), the transfer that player i makes if he has the value v, is equal to
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(n - 1) t(v„r) if r G v;
t,(v;) - -l(r,v;) if y G v; C r
-t(r,y) if v; ~ y,
and the expected transfer is
T(v;) - f I t;(v,)d~(r,y).
llilferentiating with respect lo v; we find that
7~~(v~) -(n - 1)I~ ~V' a v, t(v„r)d~(r,Y) }(n } 1)~ t(v„v~)f(v~)F(v~)~-~
- I~ I~~ ~ t(r, v;)d~(r, y) - J~ t(r, v,)d~(I, v.)o av,
} (13 - 1) t(V„ U,)f(U,)F(V;)~-~ } I, t(r,V;)[i~(I,V,).
Rearranging and collecting terms we see that
~~~(v,) - (11 - 1)v, Í(v,)F(v,)~-~ -1. (n - f)(1 - F(v~))F (v,)~ 1n- ii-1 f. ~~~ F(U,)d~(r,y)
n o
- (n - f )v, Í(v,)F(v;)~-~,
and lhis is what had to be proved. O
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